India’s takedown regime is increasingly out of step with the demands of a digital democracy, where both state accountability and citizen rights need stronger guardrails
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Last week, in X Corp. v. Union of India, the Karnataka High Court upheld the government’s use of the Sahyog portal — a digital platform for content takedown requests. While the court treated Sahyog as a valid administrative tool, its ruling went further: it endorsed a parallel system of takedowns under Section 79(3) of the IT Act, sidestepping the safeguards built into Section 69A. In doing so, it brushed aside the principles of due process recognised by the Supreme Court in its landmark Shreya Singhal judgment. The real issue, however, is not the portal itself but the law behind it: India’s takedown regime is increasingly out of step with the demands of a digital democracy, where both state accountability and citizen rights need stronger guardrails.
It is important to separate the tool from the legal basis it rests on. The portal itself is not the problem. In fact, one could argue that a digital interface for quicker coordination between law enforcement and intermediaries is a legitimate innovation. The problem is that it has been tied to a legislative route that lacks adequate checks. By giving officials powers to order takedowns without transparency, oversight, or independent review, the system leaves wide scope for arbitrary use.
Earlier, intermediaries could be directed to block content only through the formal procedure under Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules. These required takedown orders to be reasoned and subject to committee review, providing a check against misuse. Section 79(3)(b), by contrast, was never designed as a standalone power to censor content. It was simply an exception to safe harbour immunity, the legal shield that ensures platforms are not held liable for what users post, so long as they act responsibly and comply with valid orders under Section 69A. Interpreting it as an independent takedown authority flips this protection on its head, stretching the statute far beyond what Parliament ever intended.
Elaborate procedure
Section 69A embeds strong procedural safeguards to ensure transparency, accountability, and recourse for affected parties, but these protections come at a cost. The elaborate procedure slows the takedown process, meaning that by the time safeguards are observed, unlawful content may already have gone viral and caused irreparable harm. Under this section, blocking orders require a written direction, reasons and a hearing with review which are also the safeguards upheld by the Supreme Court in the Shreya Singhal case to prevent arbitrary removal and ensure recourse for parties.
By contrast, SAHYOG’s workflows are entirely digital and automated with no requirement for explanations or review. The mechanisms under Section 69A and Section 79(3) thus sit at opposite ends of the spectrum. One is burdened with procedure and delay and the other functions without any procedural guardrails whatsoever.
The Karnataka High Court’s judgment appears to endorse the government’s intent to move away from the stricter safeguards of Section 69A. At first glance, this is troubling. A closer reading, however, shows the Court acknowledging the real challenge of unlawful content spreading rapidly before procedural steps are completed. The answer, though, is not to legitimise takedowns without checks, but to update the legislative framework for today’s digital ecosystem. What is needed is a statutory rethink that retains the efficiency and intent of the Sahyog Portal, while embedding safeguards that balance urgency with accountability. Only then can the portal’s purpose be achieved without undermining due process or free expression.
Likely framework
What could such a framework look like? First, takedown powers must be anchored in primary legislation, not delegated rules. Second, Section 79(3) should be restored to its original purpose, i.e., safe harbour immunity, subject to compliance with lawful orders. Instead, Sahyog’s role could be recast within an amended Section 69A under a two-track model: (i) Emergency Blocking Orders for imminent harms like incitement or terror content, issued by a narrowly defined set of trained officers and subject to automatic expiry and mandatory review, and (ii) Standard Takedown Orders for all other unlawful content, processed under clear statutory procedures with notice, reasoned orders, and independent review. In every case, orders should clearly state the legal ground justifying the restriction on free speech.
But perhaps we also need to acknowledge a deeper truth: in an increasingly digital world where information spreads at lightning speed, harm prevention cannot rely on takedowns alone. The longer-term solution lies in redesigning platform incentives, encouraging product choices and architectures that slow virality, curb amplification of harmful content and reward responsible behaviour online. A modernised framework must therefore go hand in hand with nudges that push platforms to be designed better. Only then can urgency, accountability, and systemic safety coexist.
Digital governance today cannot be a matter of administrative convenience. It requires legislative clarity, procedural safeguards, and independent oversight, especially when state agencies can shape public discourse. A modern takedown framework must do three things: preserve administrative efficiency but embed statutory safeguards that balance urgency with accountability, and ensure independent oversight. Anything less risks turning a governance tool into a weapon of censorship.
The writer is manager at the public policy firm The Quantum Hub
Published on October 10, 2025
